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	Abstract		The	 standard	 labour	 contract	 is	 no	more.	 	 Increasingly	 it	 is	 replaced	 by	 flexible	 and	 diverse	alternative	work	arrangements	that	can	often	be	characterized	as	real	options.	In	this	paper	we	examine	optimal	labour	contracts	from	the	perspective	of	a	competitive	firm	facing	uncertainty	concerning	 both	 the	 cost	 of	 production	 and	 demand	 for	 its	 product	 or	 service.	 	 We	 initially	restrict	 the	 firm	 to	 offering	 ‘standard’	 contracts	 then	 add	 various	 alternative	 flexibility	enhancing	contracts.		We	discuss	the	circumstances	under	which	these	alternative	contracts	are	real	options,	interpret	the	strike,	compare	them	to	employment	contracts	currently	found	in	the	labour	market,	and	assess	the	benefits	and	costs.				Keywords:		Standard	labour	contract,	alternative	work	arrangements,	real	options		An	early	draft	of	this	work	was	presented	in	May	2017	at	the	Irish	Economics	Association	Annual	conference	at	NUI,	Galway,	May	2016,	and	at	the	NERI	Labour	Market	conference	at	the	University	of	Limerick.	Conference	participants	are	thanked	for	their	comments.		
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	1.		Introduction	
How	many	workers	 does	 a	 firm	 need	 to	 operate	 profitably?	 	When	 the	 “firm”	was	 a	manufacturer,	say	General	Motors,	the	answer	to	that	question	may	have	been	relatively	straightforward	once	the	decision	to	operate	a	production	line	at	a	particular	speed	was	taken.		This	is	not	the	case	in	retail.		A	“firm”,	here	more	Starbucks	than	General	Motors,	can	 be	 open	 from	 5:30	 in	 the	 morning	 to	 midnight,	 but	 the	 number	 of	 workers	 it	requires	 to	 operate	 profitably	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 day,	 from	 day	 to	 day	 and	 from	store	to	store	can	vary	hugely.			Optimal	staffing	requires	split	shifts,	short	hours,	and	on	call	arrangements	that	vary	over	the	course	of	the	day,	from	day	to	day	and	from	store	to	store.	 	This	staffing	cannot	be	achieved	via	a	“standard	labour	contract”1,	 the	union	negotiated	 contract	 that	 would	 have	 been	 offered	 to	 a	 GM	worker,	 although	 not	 the	waitress	in	the	diner.	 	While	the	institutional	and	legal	legacy	of	the	standard	contract	remains,	the	standard	labour	contract	itself	is	more	and	more	a	thing	of	the	past.	 	The	new	standard	contract	may	be	the	real	option.	
Today	 firms	 have	 expected	 lifespans	 of	 less	 than	 two	 decades.	 	 Even	 the	 GMs	 of	 the	world	must	be	nimble	to	survive.		Were	it	ever,	the	standard	contract	is	no	longer	fit	for	purpose.	Now,	non-standard	employment	relationships,	 the	so	called	alternative	work	arrangements,	are	replacing	standard	ones	(Katz	&	Krueger	2016).		
																																																								1	The	standard	labour	contract	was	a	post	WWII	social	and	a	labour	contract	providing	continuity	of	employment	in	the	employer’s	place	of	business	and	under	the	employer’s	supervision,	with	compensated	overtime	and	benefits	including	health	insurance	and	a	company	pension.		It	was	institutionalized	through	collective	bargaining,	labour	law	and	social	welfare	systems	(Kalleberg	2000),	
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In	 contrast	 to	 standard	 contracts,	 alternative	 work	 arrangements	 are	 flexible	 and	diverse,	with	supervision	and	employment	relationships	often	divorced	from	the	place	of	 work	 and	 for	 whom	 the	 work	 is	 done.	 	 Alternative	 work	 arrangements,	 many	 of	which	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 real	 options	 since	 they	 give	 the	 manager	 the	 needed	flexibility	 to	 make	 decisions	 about	 real	 labour	 assets	 (Sick	 1995),	 include	 part-time	contracts,	 temporary	 agency	 and	 contract	 company	 contracts,	 short-term	 contracts,	contingent	 work,	 such	 as	 zero-hours	 or	 on-call	 contracts,	 and	 self-employment	 or	independent	 contracting.	 	 Standard	 contracts,	 precisely	because	of	 the	 social	 contract	under	which	they	were	established	and	the	law	and	custom	that	supports	them,	provide	job	 and	 income	 security	 to	 the	 worker,	 but	 are	 costly	 to	 the	 firm	 (Kalleberg	 2003).		Alternative	work	arrangements,	 in	contrast,	provide	flexibility	both	for	employers	and	employees	alike,	but	may	be	insecure	(Berg	el	at.	2014;	Drache	et	al.	2015;	Wilthagen	&	Tros	2004).		They	allow	firms	to	control	costs,	to	improve	efficiency,	and	to	match	their	just-in-time	inventory	systems	or	the	peaks	and	troughs	of	retail	 foot	traffic	with	just-in-time	 labour	 input	 (Kalleberg	 2003).	 	 They	 have	 brought	 about	 changes	 in	 internal	firm	 structures	 (Giudetti	 &	 Pedrini	 2013;	 Lindbeck	 &	 Snower	 1988;	 Piori	 1986)	 and	how	 work	 is	 organized	 (Broschak	 &	 Davis-Blake	 2006;	 Davis-Blake,	 et	 al.	 2003;	Kalleberg	2003)..		
In	 this	 paper	 we	 examine	 the	 optimal	 labour	 contracting	 decisions	 of	 a	 firm.		Specifically,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 deriving,	 in	 the	 abstract,	 labour	 contracts	 from	 the	perspective	of	a	 firm	facing	uncertainty	over	demand	for	 its	product	or	service,	which	depends	 on	 consumer	 preference	 for	 the	 product	 or	 service	 and	 for	 the	 timing	 of	consumption	thereof,	and	its	costs	of	production,	which	depends	on	the	entry	or	exit	of	competitors,	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 substitute	 or	 complementary	 products	 by	
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competitors,	 government	 regulations	 and	 macroeconomic	 conditions,	 among	 other	things.	To	set	the	scene,	we	begin	in	section	2	by	discussing	a	firm’s	decision,	from	the	financial	 manager’s	 perspective,	 to	 hire	 workers	 under	 standard	 and	 nonstandard	contracts,	 determining	 when	 nonstandard	 contracts	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 real	options.		In	section	3	we	characterize	the	firm’s	problem	under	a	variety	of	assumptions	on	 the	 uncertainty	 it	 faces	 and	 on	 the	 flexibility	 of	 the	 labour	 input,	 developing	 and	solving	the	complete	model	and	variations	thereof	in	the	Technical	Appendix.	 	Initially	assuming	cost	 certainty	and	demand	uncertainty,	we	outline	 the	 firm’s	decision	given	an	 inflexible	 labour	market.	 	This	provides	a	baseline	 for	 comparison.	 	An	employer’s	sole	choice	variable	here	is	the	number	of	workers,	leading	to	production	of	a	good	or	service.	 	 Because	 the	 labour	 input	 is	 fixed,	 output	 may	 not	 match	 demand,	 which	 is	uncertain	 at	 the	 decision	 point.	 Both	 overproduction	 and	 underproduction	 lead	 to	losses	that	the	firm	seeks	to	minimize.		
Generalizing,	while	again	restricting	uncertainty	to	product	or	service	demand,	a	degree	of	flexibility	is	introduced	by	assuming	that	firms	can	enter	into	standard	as	well	as	real	options	(contingent)	contracts	prior	to	the	realization	of	demand	and	production	taking	place..	 	 This	 degree	 of	 flexibility	 allows	 the	 employer	 to	 match	 more	 accurately	production	with	demand.	We	then	introduce	cost	as	well	as	demand	uncertainty.	 	This	allows	firms	to	hire	workers	on	‘standard’	contracts,	who	can	be	thought	of	as	insiders	or	 core	 staff	 members,	 on	 cost-state	 contingent,	 fixed-term	 contracts,	 who	 can	 be	thought	of	as	outsiders	or	project-linked	staff,	and	on	cost	and	demand	state-contingent	contracts,	 who	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 on	 call	 staff	 or	 providers	 of	 niche	 services,	depending	on	the	product/service	being	produced.		Labour	costs	differ	across	the	three	types	 of	 workers,	 with	 insiders	 earning	 the	 standard	 wage,	 outsiders	 earning	 a	 cost	
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state	 contingent	 discount	 on	 the	 standard,	 and	 cost	 and	 demand	 state	 contingent	workers	earning	either	a	premium	or	discount	on	the	standard.			
We	 determine	when	 nonstandard	 contracts	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 real	 options	 and	interpret	the	strike	condition	from	the	financial	manager’s	perspective.		In	section	4	we	apply	our	analysis	 to	case	studies	 that	mirror	our	contracting	structures.	 In	Section	5	we	offer	some	concluding	observations.	
	
2.	Standard	Contracts	and	Real	Options:		Assessing	the	Firm’s	Employment	Decision	
Financial	 managers	 face	 three	 key	 decisions	 when	 managing	 a	 firm:	 	 the	 investing	decision,	 the	 financing	decision,	 and	 the	working	 capital	management	decision.	 	 They	must	 balance	 all	 three	 decisions	 to	 ensure	 the	 overall	 goal	 of	 the	 firm,	 to	 maximise	shareholder	wealth,	 is	achieved.	 	 In	terms	of	the	 investing	decision,	 the	firm	identifies	long-term	 investment	opportunities	 in	real	assets	 that	will	generate	 future	cash	 flows	and	 add	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 firm.	 	 In	 order	 to	 identify	 as	many	 profitable	 investment	projects	as	possible,	the	firm	must	aim	to	maximise	cash	inflows	generated	by	the	asset	and	 keep	 associated	 costs	 to	 a	minimum.	 A	 key	 component	 of	 financial	management	relates	to	human	capital	investment.			
Firms,	 having	 identified	 a	 need	 to	 hire	workers,	 can	 do	 so	 by	 issuing	many	 different	types	 of	 employment	 contracts:	 standard	 or	 nonstandard.	When	 firms	 choose	 to	 hire	workers,	 the	 type	 of	 contract	 issued	 can	 have	 considerable	 managerial	 implications	since	 different	 contracts	 have	 different	 cash	 flow	 effects	 that	 can	make	 it	 difficult	 to	establish	a	clear	link	between	types	of	employment	contracts	and	the	overall	position	of	the	firm.		The	choice	the	firm	faces	depends	on	its	expectation	of	the	net	benefits	of	each	
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type	 of	 contract.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 decision	 to	 issue	 standard	 employment	 contracts	could	be	approached	by	the	firm	from	a	stakeholder-agency	theory	perspective	(see	Hill	&	Jones	1992)	whereby	management	is	acting	to	align	the	long-term	goal	of	the	workers	with	those	of	the	firm,	thus	alleviating	any	perceived	agency	costs.		The	argument	in	this	case	 is	 that	 individuals	on	standard	contracts	see	their	 long-term	future	with	the	 firm	and	 develop	 skills	 and	 work	 more	 productively	 than	 individuals	 employed	 on	nonstandard	contracts	that	do	not	promise	a	long-term	employment	relationship.		This	efficiency	 gain,	 however,	 must	 be	 set	 against	 the	 higher	 implied	 costs	 in	 terms	 of	training	of	and	long-term	benefits	for	employees,	thus	reducing	the	amount	of	free	cash	flow	 available	 for	 yet	 unforeseen	 alternative	 uses.	 Hiring	 workers	 on	 short-term	contracts,	because,	for	example,	of	the	lack	of	commitment	by	the	firm	to	its	employees,	may	 result	 in	 lower	 productivity	 (Wandera	 2011;	 Foote	 &	 Folta	 2002;	 Dolado	 et	 al.	2016).				While	lower	productivity	is	a	potential	cost	of	hiring	workers	on	non-standard	contracts,	there	are	potential	benefits	in	terms	of	lower	total	labour	costs	and	increased	flexibility.	 	 Empirical	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 employing	 workers	 on	 non-standard	contracts	is	often	cheaper	to	the	firm,	even	if	they	are	less	productive,	as	these	workers	are	 not	 entitled	 to	 as	 many	 long-term	 benefits	 as	 their	 counterparts	 on	 standard	contracts	(Osawa	et	al.	2013).		It	is	the	latter	benefit	of	flexibility	that	is	most	important	to	 our	 analysis	 as	 it	 is	 the	 flexibility	 of	 non-standard	 employment	 contracts	 that	 can	transform	them	into	valuable	real	options.	
Originating	 in	 the	 finance	 discipline,	 the	 term	 “real	 option”	 was	 coined	 by	 Stewart	Myers	in	1977	and	described	by	Sick	(1995)	as	“the	flexibility	a	manager	has	for	making	decisions	about	real	assets”.		One	thing	relatively	certain	when	dealing	with	investing	in	fixed	assets	or	 long-term	operations	 is	 that	new	 information	will	 reveal	 itself	 as	 time	
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evolves.	 	 When	 new	 information	 arrives,	 it	 might	 affect	 managerial	 decisions	 and	 a	question	of	 considerable	 importance	 is	whether	or	not	managers	 can	exploit	 the	new	information	to	the	firm’s	advantage.	
Real	options	are	everywhere	and	in	reality	managers	have	many	options	to	adapt	and	revise	 their	 decisions	 in	 response	 to	 new	 and	 unexpected	 developments.	 One	 of	 the	difficulties	 for	 researchers	 and	 practitioners	 alike	 is	 how	 to	 capture	 and	 quantify	 the	value	of	such	flexibility	at	the	point	of	the	initial	investment	decision.	The	real	options	approach	 in	 finance	 is	 becoming	 increasingly	 popular	 as	 it	 is	 widely	 recognized	 that	incorporating	flexibility	into	large	capital	 investment	decisions	has	real	value	and	that	such	 value	 should	 be	 integrated	 into	 the	 firm’s	 decision	making.	 Traditional	 analysis	(such	as	discounted	cash	flow	analysis)	assumes	a	passive	management	strategy	where	the	 decision	 to	 undertake	 a	 project	 is	 based	 on	 forecasting	 future	 cash	 flows,	discounting	them	back	to	today	and	comparing	them	with	the	cost	of	the	project.			While	this	type	of	analysis	is	widely	used	due	to	ease	of	calculation	and	understanding,	there	is	no	flexibility	and	no	option	for	management	to	adjust	strategies	due	to	evolving	market	conditions.	 In	 essence,	 the	 value	 of	 flexibility	 is	 ignored	 or	 assumed	 away.	 Further,	investments	 tend	 to	be	undervalued	by	NPV	analysis	due	 to	 the	assumption	 that	cash	flows	 follow	a	constant	pattern	and	can	be	accurately	predicted.	Real	options	offer	an	alternative	 insight	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 uncertainty	 on	 the	 value	 of	 project	investment	opportunities.		Common	types	of	real	options	include	the	option	to	delay	an	investment,	 the	 option	 to	 expand,	 the	 option	 to	 abandon,	 the	 option	 to	 stage	 an	investment	and	production	flexibility	options.	 	Projects	that	can	be	scaled	up	or	down	are	worth	more	than	similar	projects	that	lack	the	flexibility	to	scale	operations	and	the	more	uncertainty	there	is	surrounding	future	cash	flows	that	the	projects	will	generate	
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the	more	value	there	is	to	the	real	option.	For	example,	managers	can	often	expand	or	contract	production	in	response	to	changes	in	costs	or	demand,	thus	exploiting	upside	gains	while	limiting	downside	losses.		
Real	options	analysis	is	commonly	applied	to	the	consideration	of	investing	in	long	term	capital	 projects	 and	 research	 and	 development	 where	 the	 up-front	 cost	 of	 capital	 is	high.	 	 For	 example	 they	 are	 widely	 used	 when	 assessing	 renewable	 energy	 projects	(Boomsma	et	al.	2012;	Fernandes	et	al.	2011;	Lee	&	Shih	2010),	in	the	mining	industry	(Moel	&	Tufano	2002;	Slade	2000),	and	strategic	 investment	decisions	(Krychowski	&	Quelin	 2010).	 Some	 studies	 have	 also	 considered	 the	 value	 of	 real	 options	 in	 human	capital	(Bhattacharya	&	Wright	2005;	Brady	2017;	Foote	&	Folta	2002;	Musselin	2005;	Van	Emmerik	&	Sanders	2004).	We	add	 to	 the	existing	body	of	 literature	 that	applies	the	 concept	 of	 real	 options	 to	 labour	 contracts	 by	 assessing	 whether	 the	 inherent	flexibility	 of	 non-standard	 employment	 contracts	 can	 be	 used	 by	 firms	 to	 respond	 to	changes	in	its	cost	structure	while	aligning	production	and	demand,	thereby	limiting	the	downside	risk	of	long-term	operations	while	exploiting	any	upside	that	such	flexibility	allows.	With	 respect	 to	 traditional	 employment	 contracts,	 the	 cost	 to	 the	 firm	 of	 the	workers	 is	 largely	 irreversible.	 	 If	 external	market	 conditions	 are	 such	 that	 the	 firm’s	revenues	 fall	 sharply,	 terminating	 employment	 contracts	 given	 current	 demand	conditions	or	maintaining	employment	in	the	hope	that	demand	will	revive	might	prove	so	costly	that	 it	pushes	the	firm	towards	financial	distress.	Non-standard	employment	contracts	 on	 the	 other	 hand	provide	 flexibility	 to	 the	 firm	 that	 standard	 employment	contracts	 do	 not.	 	 This	 is	 of	 strategic	 and	 financial	 importance	 to	 the	 firm	 given	 the	empirical	evidence	showing	such	flexibility	may	add	value	to	the	firm.		In	effect,	flexible	employment	 contracts	 allow	 firms	 to	 scale	 employee	numbers	up	or	 down	quickly	 in	
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response	 to	 changing	 cost	or	demand	conditions.	Hence	 the	 firm	can	 limit	 the	 cost	of	paying	 wages	 when	 demand	 is	 low	 and	 exploit	 strong	 market	 conditions	 by	immediately	 increasing	production	when	demand	 is	high,	 thereby	aligning	production	with	market	demand	conditions	(provided	there	are	no	production	capacity	issues),	and	it	 can	 replace	 permanent	 labour	 with	 contract	 labour	 to	 avoid	 legacy	 staffing	 issues	when	its	cost	environment	changes.		Conceptually,	we	can	view	the	use	of	non-standard	employment	contracts	as	a	variable	cost	of	production	as	opposed	to	standard	contracts	which	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 fixed	 cost.	 	 One	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 using	 such	 non-standard	 contracts	 could	 be	 to	 allow	 managers	 to	 adapt	 their	 production	 (output)	decisions	as	market	conditions	change,	thus	contributing	toward	the	goal	of	maximizing	shareholder	wealth.		As	such,	any	real	options	embedded	in	non-standard	employment	contracts	can	have	value.		Other	reasons	for	hiring	workers	on	non-standard	contracts	include	 lower	 cost	 and	 less	 compliance	 requirements	 in	 terms	 of	 employment	legislation.	Even	if	hiring	workers	on	non-traditional	employment	contracts	comes	with	a	cost,	the	net	benefit,	the	value	of	the	real	option,	may	still	be	positive.		If	so,	the	firm	will	avail	of	this	instrument.	
3.		Demand	for	Labour	when	Demand	and/or	Costs	are	Uncertain	
To	analyse	the	firm’s	decision	concerning	the	use	of	a	variety	of	nonstandard	in	addition	to	 standard	 labour	 contracts,	 we	 describe,	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 Lazear	 &	 Shaw	 (2007),	 a	simple	model	of	cost	minimization	in	the	face	of	demand	and	cost	uncertainty.	2			Under	a	series	of	assumptions	concerning	the	contracts	available	to	the	firm,	we	define	which	
																																																								2	The	formal	model	is	developed	and	analyzed	in	the	Technical	Appendix.		
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of	the	alternative	arrangements	can	be	considered	real	options.		We	then	interpret	the	strike	condition	and	assess	the	value	of	the	option	to	the	firm.		
Assume	 initially	 that	all	 costs	of	production	are	 certain	but	 that	demand	 is	uncertain.	Before	 uncertainty	 is	 resolved,	 decisions	 are	 taken	 which	 lead	 to	 output	 being	produced.	 If	 output	 and	demand	differ,	 losses	 are	 incurred.	We	 abstract	 from	 capital,	and	look	at	the	employment	decision.	
In	our	initial	setting,	the	choice	variable	is	the	number	of	workers	which	implies	a	fixed	number	 of	 work	 hours..	 	 The	 workers	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 being	 on	 “standard	contracts,”	 that	 is,	 full	 time,	 permanent	 and	 pensionable.	 	 	 Assume	 to	 produce	 any	output	some	workers	on	standard	contracts	must	be	hired.		These	can	be	interpreted	as	the	required	managerial	input,	which	could	be	in	head	office	or	at	individual	production	locations,	such	as	retail	outlets.		Thereafter	the	production	function	exhibits	constant	or	diminishing	 returns	 to	 scale.	 	 	 Thus,	 given	 any	 labour	 input	 the	 firm	knows	precisely	how	much	output	it	can	produce.	
Demand	is	random	and	depends	on	a	myriad	of	market	and	non-market	forces.			Ideally	the	firm	wants	only	to	produce	enough	to	meet	demand.		If	the	firm	is	in	the		retail	trade	it	wants	to	have	adequate	employees	on	the	floor	to	meet	customer	needs,	neither	too	few	so	that	customers	do	not	get	served	in	a	reasonable	amount	of	time	nor	too	many	so	that	 some	employees	have	nothing	 to	do.	 	 	 If	 the	 firm	 is	 in	manufacturing	 it	wants	 to	have	enough	workers	to	produce	the	amount	of	good	demanded	without	building	up	or	drawing	 down	 inventory	 unduly.	 	 	 Deviations	 of	 output,	which	 can	 be	 real	 output	 or	service	 potential,	 from	 demand	 are	 costly.	 	 	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 large	 ticket	items,	 items	 with	 high	 storage	 costs	 or	 items	 that	 become	 obsolete	 quickly,	
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overproduction	will	be	very	costly.		In	contrast,	underproduction	leads	to	incurring	the	opportunity	cost	of	disappointed	customers.		
The	 firm,	 restricted	 to	 hiring	 workers	 on	 standard	 contracts	 and	 producing	 to	 meet	uncertain	demand,	has	to	take	a	middle	path,	always	missing	target	demand,	where	the	extent	of	the	deviation	depends	on	the	cost	of	labour	and	on	whether	the	expected	loss	of	under	or	overproduction	is	higher.	 	If	demand	is	relatively	certain	and	the	expected	loss	of	missing	target	demand	is	low,	perhaps	because	goods	demand	can	be	smoothed	by	building	up	or	drawing	down	inventories	at	a	low	cost,	then	the	benefit	in	terms	of	good	 employee	 relations	 of	 relying	 on	 standard	 contracts	 alone	 may	 be	 worth	 the	implied	cost.		However,	when	the	firm	is	providing	a	service	that	cannot	be	inventoried	rather	than	producing	a	good	that	can	be,	the	firm	would	prefer,	all	else	equal,	a	more	flexible	employment	structure.	
Now	 consider	 the	 same	 environment	 as	 above,	 but	 assume	 that	 the	 firm	 receives	 a	verifiable	 signal	 of	 demand	 before	 production	 commences	 but	 after	 labour	 contracts	have	been	negotiated.	 	This	allows	 the	 firm	to	adjust	 its	 labour	 input	by,	 for	example,	requiring	current	workers	to	work	overtime	or	by	hiring	additional	contingent	workers.		Assume	 overtime	 hours	 for	workers	 on	 standard	 contracts	 are	 paid	 a	 premium,	 that	contingently	contracted	workers	may	but	need	not	be	paid	a	premium	and	that	labour	markets	are	segmented:		wages	and	benefits	for	workers	on	standard	contracts	do	not	have	to	be	offered	to	contingent	workers.			These	contracts	for	contingent	labour,	which	can	be	characterized	as	real	options	contracts,	must	be	negotiated	before	the	signal	of	demand	has	been	received.3		What	is	critical	for	firms	in	their	decision	to	exercise	their	
																																																								3	The	literature	cited	above	suggests	that	hiring	contingent	labour	can	have	either	positive	or	negative	external	effects	leading	to	workers	being	either	more	or	less	productive.		These	effects	
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option	 to	 hire	 contingent	 labour,	 that	 is,	 what	 defines	 the	 strike,	 is	 the	 difference	 in	demand	between	high	and	 low	demand	states	relative	to	the	cost	of	hiring	contingent	workers	 to	 meet	 demand	 peaks.	 	 For	 some	 firms,	 especially	 those	 in	 retail,	 these	demand	 deviations	 occur	 on	 a	 daily	 or	 hourly	 basis	 leading	 firms	 to	 use	 predictive	scheduling	 which	 optimizes	 labour	 usage.	 	 For	 other	 firms,	 demand	 deviations	 are	project	 related	 causing	 them	 to	 increase	 or	 reduce	 their	 staff	 to	meet	 fluctuations	 in	project	requirements.		Contingent	labour	does	not	replace	labour	on	standard	contracts	entirely,	rather	it	offers	a	just-in-time	labour	input	that	anticipates	demand.	
The	model	can	be	generalized	further	to	encompass	both	cost	and	demand	fluctuations.		In	this	framework	real	options	contracts	can	be	used	to	meet	changes	in	the	cost	and/or	the	 demand	 environment	 where	 these	 contracts	 are	 specific	 to	 the	 source	 of	 the	fluctuation.		Cost	fluctuations	can	depend	on	the	entry	or	exit	of	competitors,	exchange	rate	 fluctuations,	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 substitute	 or	 complementary	 products	 or	services,	 technological	 innovation,	 government	 regulations	 or	 other	 macroeconomic	conditions.	 	 For	 example,	 entry	 of	 competitors,	 Costa	 opens	 an	 outlet	 across	 from	Starbucks,	 or	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 substitute	 or	 complementary	 products	 or	services,	 Amazon	 buys	Whole	 Foods	 and	 adds	 its	 products	 to	 its	 Amazon	 Fresh	 line	challenging	Walmart	and	Costco,	could	affect	the	costs	of	missing	demand	targets,	while	government	 regulation	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 governing	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	permanent	 and	 temporary	 contracts,	Macron’s	 reforms	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 hiring	 and	
																																																																																																																																																																												can	be	accommodated	in	the	model	by	assuming	that	the	firm	hires	effective	units	of	labour	for	the	effective	price	of	that	labour.		So,	if	the	external	effects	are	positive	the	cost	of	hiring	an	effective	unit	of	labour	is	lower,	while	if	the	external	effects	are	negative,	the	cost	of	hiring	an	effective	unit	of	labour	is	higher.	The	external	effects	on	the	permanent	staff	and	the	contingent	staff	do	not	need	to	be	the	same.		Since	the	main	results	of	the	model	are	not	affected	by	specifying	these	external	effects,	because	cost	considerations	will	remain	at	the	root	of	firm	decisions,	we	note	but	abstract	from	them	in	our	analysis.	
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firing	 permanent	 workers,	 or	 labour	 market	 tightness	 could	 increase	 the	 wages	 of	contingently	hired	workers,	while	changes	in	technology,	such	as	accounting	and	legal	search	software,	 could	change	 the	need	 for	workers	on	permanent	contracts.	 	 	 In	 this	more	complex	environment	flexibility	in	labour	contracting	allows	the	firm	to	adjust	to	cost	uncertainty,	thereby	saving	on	costly	standard	labour,	and	demand	uncertainty,	by	hiring	 demand	 contingent	 labour.	 	 The	 strike	 for	 the	 cost	 contingent	 real	 options	depends	on	the	cost	saving	of	hiring	temporary	relative	to	permanent	workers,	where	any	productivity	differentials	are	subsumed	in	the	wage	discount,	given	the	operational	need	for	some	employment	continuity	that	permanent	workers	provide.		The	strike	for	the	 demand	 contingent	 real	 options	 contract	 depends	 on	 fluctuations	 in	 demand	relative	to	the	cost	of	hiring	contingent	workers	to	meet	demand	peaks.		
	
4.		Case	Studies	
Cost	and	demand	uncertainty,	which	drives	 the	 firm’s	demand	 for	 labour,	depends	on	the	 competitive,	 regulatory	 and	 macroeconomic	 environment	 in	 which	 the	 firm	produces	 as	well	 as	 the	 firm’s	 perceptions	 of	 the	 fickleness	 of	 consumer	preferences.		The	wage	premium	and	discount	depend	on	labour	market	regulations	governing	full-time	 permanent	 and	 pensionable	 employment,	 full-time	 temporary	 employment,	 and	part-time	or	contingent	employment	including	non-wage	benefits,	here	incorporated	in	the	wage,	costs	of	hiring	and	firing	including	redundancy	payments,	etc.,	union	strength,	labour	market	 conditions	 (slackness	 or	 tightness),	 overall	macroeconomic	 conditions	and	 worker	 preferences.	 	 The	 firm’s	 optimal	 decision	 depends	 both	 on	 product	 or	service	and	labour	market	conditions.	
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While	flexibility	is	valued	in	theory,	it	can	be	expensive.		A	firm	will	take	out	real	options	on	contingent	labour	when	deviations	from	the	standard	contract	allow	it	to	reduce	its	production	 costs	 while	 getting	 closer	 to	 its	 demand	 targets	 at	 an	 acceptable	 cost.		Clearly,	if	the	base	wage	or	contingent	wages	are	high	and/or	the	benefit	of	contingent	workers	 is	 low	while	 the	 cost	of	missing	 target	demand	or	demand	variability	 is	 low,	then	the	cost	of	flexibility	exceeds	the	benefits	thereof,	and	the	firm	eschews	contingent	labour.	 	 To	 address	 whether	 the	 theoretical	 conditions	 we	 have	 derived	 are	 met	 in	practice,	we	examine	a	number	of	case	studies.		
Case	Study	1:		Responding	to	Uncertain	Demand		
Menlo	 Innovations,	 a	 software	 design	 company	 in	 Ann	 Arbor,	 Michigan,	 is	 well	recognized	 for	 its	 flexible	 work	 practices	 and	 benefits	 for	 full-time,	 permanent	staff.		These	practices	have	led	it	to	be	a	repeat	winner	of	the	Alfred	P.	Sloan	Award	for	Excellence	 in	 Workplace	 Effectiveness	 and	 Flexibility	 (Galinski	 &	 Jackson	 2014).		 To	meet	 increases	 in	 demand,	 contractors	 are	 hired.		 They	 fully	 share	 the	work	 and	 are	integrated	into	the	design	teams,	but	are	paid	less	and	are	not	eligible	for	the	in	or	out	of	 work	 benefits,	 such	 as	 sick,	 maternity	 and	 holiday	 pay,	 that	 full-time	 employees	receive.	As	they	are	hired	explicitly	to	meet	fluctuations	in	demand,	they	are	let	go	when	demand	 returns	 to	normal	 levels	 (Reynolds	Lewis	2011).	 	Menlo’s	behaviour	appears	consistent	 with	 that	 predicted	 given	 a	market	 wage	 structure	 that	 allows	 contingent	labour	to	be	hired	at	a	discount	to	the	standard	wage.4	
Menlo	 Innovations	 provide	 software	 design	 to	 the	 technology	 industry,	 a	 rapidly	evolving	market.	They	maintain	a	very	 lean	organization	to	guard	against	costly	over-
																																																								4	See	Model	2	in	the	Technical	Appendix.	
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staffing,	instead	relying	on	short-term	employment	contracts	that	can	be	characterized	as	real	options.	Given	that	both	overproduction	and	underproduction	 lead	 to	 losses,	a	concept	 contrary	 to	 the	 firm’s	 goal	 of	 maximising	 shareholder	 wealth,	 Menlo	Innovations	takes	advantage	of	the	flexibility	characteristic	of	the	short-term	contracts	that	allow	them	to	respond	immediately	to	increased	demand	by	expanding	production.		Therefore	 the	 option	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 option	 to	 expand.	 The	 firm	will	 choose	 to	exercise	 the	 option	 in	 order	 to	 exploit	 the	 upside	 opportunities	 by	 increasing	production	to	align	it	with	demand.		It	is	analogous	to	a	call	option.		This	is	illustrated	in	Figure	1.1.		When	demand	is	as	anticipated,	the	value	of	Menlo’s	output	will	be	positive,	there	will	be	little	if	any	over	or	underproduction	and	Menlo	Innovations	will	continue	operations	using	workers	employed	on	standard	employment	contracts.		When	the	level	of	demand	 increases	and	 the	value	of	output	 reaches	 the	strike,	 they	will	 issue	short-term	contracts	to	address	the	unanticipated	increased	levels	of	demand,	thus	becoming	even	more	profitable.		The	higher	the	demand	is,	the	more	short-term	contracts	that	will	be	issued	until	underproduction	is	eliminated.		
Figure	1.1:	Payoff	to	Menlo	Innovations	of	real	option	to	expand	
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Menlo	 Innovations’	 policy	 of	 issuing	 short-term	 employment	 contracts	 to	 address	changing	 demand	means	 that	 its	 operations	 actually	 contain	 a	 series	 of	 real	 options.		Consider	the	case	where	the	firm	has	exercised	the	option	to	hire	additional	workers	to	cope	with	 increasing	 demand.	 	 Once	 time	 has	 passed,	 demand	might	 drop	 to	 normal	levels	 again	 and	 they	 will	 no	 longer	 require	 the	 additional	 contracted	 workers.		Observing	 the	 fall	 in	 demand	 and	 given	 the	 flexibility	 inherent	 in	 the	 short-term	employment	contracts,	management	can	now	choose	to	cancel	these	contracts	and	limit	the	 costs	 associated	with	overproduction,	 once	again	aligning	production	output	with	demand.		In	this	case,	the	real	option	to	contract	operations	is	analogous	to	a	put	option.		This	is	illustrated	in	Figure	1.2.		Here,	the	value	of	the	firm’s	operations	is	positive	until	the	 strike.	 	 Once	 the	 strike	 is	 reached,	 the	 firm	will	 exercise	 the	 option	 to	 cancel	 the	short-term	employment	contracts	to	avoid	losses	incurred	as	a	result	of	overproduction	until	the	point	that	production	and	demand	are	commensurate	with	each	other.		Hence,	we	have	 illustrated	how	the	 flexibility	of	 the	short-term	employment	contracts	allows	management	to	limit	downside	losses	by	exercising	the	real	option	to	contract.	
Figure	1.2:	Payoff	to	Menlo	Innovations	of	real	option	to	contract	
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Menlo	 Innovations	 can	 continue	 to	 exercise	 these	 options	 to	 contract	 and	 expand	operations	 through	 issuing	 short-term	 employment	 contracts,	 thus	 limiting	 the	 costs	associated	 with	 under	 and	 over	 production	 that	 standard	 contracts	 cannot.	 The	 real	option	clearly	has	value	to	the	firm.	Each	option	can	be	valued	as	either	a	call	option	(to	expand)	or	a	put	option	(to	contract).		
An	 examination	 of	 job	 search	 web	 sites,	 such	 as	 Indeed.com,	People2People.force.com.au,	 wallstreetservices.com	 or	 movemeon.com	 reveals	 that	Menlo’s	 strategy	 is	 shared	by	many	 firms	 the	world	 over,	 often	 requiring	 very	highly	skilled	staff,	such	as	senior	tax	accountants,	IT	engineers	or	project	managers,	for	short	periods	of	time,	often	as	little	as	two	months.		To	get	the	right	people	at	the	right	time	firms	are	often	willing	and	obliged	to	pay	a	premium.	
Case	Study	2:		Insider-Outsider/	Core-Periphery	Workforce		
Because	 of	 the	 very	 different	 costs	 involved	 in	 hiring	 and	 firing	 workers	 granted	permanent	 (CDI,	 Contrat	 à	durée	 indéterminée)	contracts	 in	 France,	 short-term	 (CDD,	
Contrat	à	durée	déterminée)	 contracts,	 contracts	 that	 are	 limited	 in	 duration	 and	 can	only	be	renewed	once	before	the	employee	must	either	be	offered	a	CDI	position	or	let	go,	 are	 often	 the	 preferred	 way	 to	 meet	 even	 stable	 demand	 (Le	 Barbanchon	 &	Malherbert	 2013)	 given	 cost	 uncertainty,	 creating	 an	 insider-outsider	 model	 of	employment.		 In	 France	 in	 2015,	 four	 out	 of	 five	 new	 hires	 were	 on	 CDD	 contracts,	including	that	offered	to	Marine	at	a	Paris	cosmetics	firm	(Rose	2015),	a	position	which	required	her	to	relocate	to	accept	but	did	not	provide	the	job	security	required	to	rent	a	flat.		 CDD	 contracts	 do	 not,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 lead	 to	 CDI	 contracts.		 In	 2010,	 for	example,	 only	 5.6%	 of	 workers	 on	 CDD	 contracts	 transitioned	 to	 CDI	 contracts	 (Le	
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Barbanchon	 &	 Malherbert	 2013).	 	 The	 behaviour	 of	 firms	 issuing	 CDD	 contracts	 in	France	is	consistent	with	firms	facing	both	demand	and	cost	uncertainty.		CDD	contracts	are	 state	 contingent	 contracts,	 exercised	after	 the	 cost	 state	 is	 realized	 if	 the	 strike	 is	reached.	 	When	the	firm	increases	(reduces)	CDD	contract	hiring	 it	 is	exercising	a	call	(put)	real	option	as	shown	in	figure	1.1	(1.2),	where	flexibility	here	is	of	benefit	not	as	a	result	of	demand	but	cost	uncertainty.5	
In	 the	 UK	 some	 industries	 and	 public	 sector	 employers	 maintain	 a	 minimal	 core	 of	permanent	workers	and	utilize	temporary	(peripheral)	workers	to	meet	fluctuations	in	costs	 and/or	 demand.	 	 Some	 firms,	 such	 as	 gyms	 and	 leisure	 centres,	 build	 up	 a	substantial	pool	of	on	call	workers	to	meet	these	cost	and	demand	fluctuations,	others,	such	 as	 child	 care	 centres,	 warehouses,	 such	 as	 Amazon	 (Cadwaller	 2013)	 and	SportsDirect	 (Business,	 Innovation	 and	 Skills	 Committee	 2016),	 and	 schools,	 rely	 on	agency	 staff	 who	 provide	 both	 the	 staff	 and	 the	 line	 supervision	 thereof.	 	 This	core/periphery	model	is	used	to	meet	demand	as	closely	as	possible	while	minimizing	labour	costs	(Metcalf	&	Dudwar	2010).		These	firms’	behaviour	can	be	interpreted	in	the	context	of		both	demand	and	cost	uncertainty.		The	firm	writes	two	types	of	real	options	contracts,	those	for	temporary	contract	workers	in	the	presence	of	cost	fluctuations	and	those	for	contingent	workers	given	fluctuations	in	demand.		They	can	be	characterized	as	call	and	put	real	options	as	in	the	above	examples	where	firms	exercise	the	options	once	the	cost	state	and/or	demand	state	is	realized.	
Case	Study	3:		Retail	and	Food	Service		
The	retail	and	food	service	industries	face	fluctuating	demand	on	an	hourly,	daily,	and	
																																																								5	See	Model	3	in	the	Technical	Appendix.	
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seasonal	basis.		Demand	can	spike	for	a	day	or	a	week	as	a	result	of	a	playoff	birth	for	a	local	sports	team,	can	plummet	because	of	poor	weather	or	temporary	road	closures	as	a	result	of	repaving	or	other	maintenance	work.	 	To	respond	to	ever	shifting	demand,	scheduling	software	programs	(Goldin	2015)	are	often	used	to	obtain	optimal	staffing	levels,	 while	 managers	 are	 required	 to	 meet	 corporate	 profitability	 goals	 via	 their	staffing	 decisions	 while	 staying	 within	 overall	 staffing	 limits	 (Lambert	 and	 Henley	2010).	 	 Once	 staffing	 decisions	 are	 made,	 work	 schedules	 to	 workers	 with	 an	employment	 relationship,	 but	 possibly	without	 specific	 guaranteed	 hours,	 that	 reflect	demand	variability	are	issued,	sometimes	less	than	three	days	prior	to	the	beginning	of	the	 workweek	 where	 within	 week	 scheduling	 changes	 in	 response	 to	 unanticipated	demand	shifts	are	always	possible	(Kantor	2014).		These	employment	contracts,	which	are	 more	 and	 more	 common	 and	 represent	 an	 ever	 increasing	 share	 of	 all	 labour	contracts	issued	(Goldin	2015)	can	be	considered	as	a	collection	of	real	time	call	and	put	real	 options.	 	 By	 allowing	 firms	 to	minimize	 employment	 costs	 while	 providing	 high	level	service	fulfilment,	these	real	options	provide	value.	
5.		Conclusion	
In	this	paper	we	have	examined	why	firms	may	prefer	to	hire	at	least	a	portion	of	their	labour	on	alternative	work	arrangements	 rather	 than	on	 standard	 contracts.	 	 Even	 in	the	 context	 of	 our	 very	 simple	 framework	 many	 real-world	 hiring	 practices	 are	replicated.		These	practices	can	be	interpreted	as	firms	using	a	set	of	standard	contracts	and	alternative	work	arrangements,	which	 include	but	are	not	 limited	 to	real	options.		The	real	options	take	the	form	of	contingent	contracts	for	labour	services	agreed	for	a	period,	 at	 a	 wage,	 that	 can	 be	 exercised	 or	 not	 depending	 on	 the	 realization	 of	 a	production	cost	and/or	a	demand	state.		As	in	the	real	world,	the	preferred	alternative	
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work	arrangement	 from	 the	perspective	of	 the	 firm	may	not	be	 low	wage,	 temporary	contracts	 but	 may,	 rather,	 be	 for	 high	 wage,	 critically	 important	 but	 temporary	contracts.	 	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	 the	 real	 option	 value	 of	 non-standard	employment	 contracts	 will	 differ	 greatly	 across	 firms,	 industries	 and	 across	workers	within	an	industry.		But	as	non-standard	employment	continues	to	grow,	so	should	the	use	of	real	options.	
Firms’	 ability	 to	 avail	 of	 real	 options	 in	 the	 form	 of	 alternative	 work	 arrangements	clearly	 benefits	 a	 firm	 when	 faced	 with	 significant	 cost	 and/or	 demand	 uncertainty.		However,	the	benefit	to	the	worker	faced	with	unpredictable	schedules	and	total	work	hours	 is	 open	 to	question.	 	 It	may	be	 that	 firms	 through	 their	use	of	 real	 options	 are	shifting	 economic	 costs	 onto	 workers	 rather	 than	 reducing	 them	 through	 efficiency	gains.	This	question	motivates	our	future	research.			
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Technical	Appendix		For	analytical	simplicity,	we	present	a	one	period	model.		It	can	be	easily	generalized	to	multiple	periods.	 	Model	One:		The	Inflexible	Labour	Market,	Certain	Costs,	Uncertain	Demand	Assume	production	 takes	 time,	and	that,	while	costs	are	certain,	demand	 is	uncertain.	Before	demand	uncertainty	is	resolved,	decisions	are	taken	which	lead	to	output	being	produced.	 If	 output	 and	demand	differ,	 losses	 are	 incurred.	We	 abstract	 from	 capital,	and	look	at	the	employment	decision.			In	 our	 initial	 model,	 the	 choice	 variable	 is	 the	 number	 of	 worker	 hours,	 N.	 	 These	workers	can	be	thought	of	as	being	on	“standard	contracts,”	that	is,	full	time,	permanent	and	 pensionable.	 	 With	 capital	 fixed,	 output,	 q(N),	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 choice	 of	N,	where	𝑞 𝑁 − 𝜖 = 0, 𝜖,𝑁 ≥ 0, 𝜖 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑞! 𝑁 > 0, 𝑞"(𝑁) ≤ 0, 	𝑁 ≥ 𝑁 	,	 where	 N	 is	 the	total	 labour	 input.	 These	 assumptions	 on	 the	 production	 function	 suggest	 that	 firms	require	some	workers	on	standard	contracts	 to	be	able	 to	produce.	 	This	 is	 irrelevant	for	our	initial	model,	but	is	critical	for	subsequent	models.	Demand,	𝑦 ∈ 𝑦,𝑦 	is	 random.	 	 It	 takes	on	 two	values,	𝑦,	with	subjective	probability	𝜋,	or	𝑦,	 with	 probability	 1− 𝜋 .		 	 To	 ensure	 production	 takes	 place,	 assume	𝑦 > 𝑞 𝑁 .			We	think	of	𝑦	as	the	normal	level	of	demand.	We	 define	 a	 loss,	 or	 disutility	 function,	 as	𝐿! 𝑞 − 𝑦 , 𝐿!! > 0, 𝐿!" > 0 	if	 the	 firm	overproduces	 and	𝐿! 𝑦 − 𝑞 , 𝐿!! > 0, 𝐿!" > 0	if	 the	 firm	under-produces.	 	 	We	 assume	that	the	producer	is	a	price	taker	in	both	the	product	market	and	input	market,	where	the	unit	price	of	labour	for	those	on	the	standard	contract	is	w.		The	producer’s	problem	is	to	minimise	loss	by	choice	of	N.		To	 be	 able	 to	 solve	 explicitly	 for	N	 in	 various	 characterizations	 of	 the	model,	 assume	that	output	is	linear	in	the	labour	input:		q	=	N,	and	that	the	loss	functions	are	quadratic	so	that	 𝐿! 𝑞 − 𝑦 = 𝑎 𝑞 − 𝑦 !	and	𝐿! 𝑦 − 𝑞 = 𝑏 𝑦 − 𝑞 !,	𝑎, 𝑏 > 1.	Substituting	 N	 for	 q,	 the	 firm	 chooses	 N	 to	 minimise	 the	 cost	 of	 production	 given	random	demand,	the	cost	of	over-	or	under-production,	and	the	minimum	labour	input	required	for	production	to	take	place.			min𝜋𝑎(𝑁 − 𝑦)! + 1− 𝜋 𝑏(𝑦 − 𝑁)! + 𝑤𝑁 − 𝜇(𝑁 − 𝑁)	The	first-order	conditions	are	2𝜋𝑎 𝑁 − 𝑦 − 2 1− 𝜋 𝑏 𝑦 − 𝑁 + 𝑤 − 𝜇 = 0	𝑁 − 𝑁 ≥ 0	
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Under	the	assumption	that	𝑦 > 𝑁,	the	nonnegativity	constraint	will	not	bind	and	𝜇 = 0.	The	second-order	conditions	for	a	minimum	are	satisfied	since	𝑎𝜋 + 𝑏 1− 𝜋 > 0	Solving	for	N	we	find	
𝑁 = 𝑎𝜋𝑦 + 𝑏(1− 𝜋)𝑦𝑎𝜋 + 𝑏(1− 𝜋) − 𝑤2[𝑎𝜋 + 𝑏 1− 𝜋 ]	where	it	is	straightforward	to	show		 𝑑𝑁𝑑𝑤 < 0	𝑑𝑁𝑑𝑦 ,𝑑𝑁𝑑𝑦 > 0	
!"!" < 0	if	𝑦 − 𝑦 >  !! !!! !	𝑑𝑁𝑑𝑏 > 0	!"!" < 0	if	!(!!!)!!" < (𝑦 − 𝑦)	which	is	clearly	true	for 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏.			In	addition,	for	!! < 𝑏(1− 𝜋)(𝑦 − 𝑦),		𝑦 < 𝑁 < 𝑦.			Model	2:	 	Overtime	and/or	Contingent	Employment	Contracts	with	Cost	Certainty	and	Demand	Uncertainty	Consider	 the	 same	 environment	 as	 above,	 but	 now	 assume	 that	 the	 firm	 receives	 a	perfect	and	verifiable	signal	of	demand	after	production	has	commenced	that	allows	the	firm	 to	 adjust	 its	 labour	 input	 by	 requiring	 current	workers	 to	work	 overtime	 or	 by	hiring	 additional	 workers.	 	 Assume	 overtime	 hours	 are	 paid	 a	 premium,	 that	contingently	contracted	workers	may	but	need	not	be	paid	a	premium	and	that	labour	markets	are	segmented.	 	 	These	real	options	contracts	must	be	negotiated	prior	to	the	commencement	of	production,	that	is,	before	the	signal	of	demand	has	been	received.	Since	 the	 firm	would	never	 hire	 contingent	 staff	 if	 the	 low	demand	 state	 is	 signalled,	contingent	staffing	is	potentially	feasible	and	optimal	for	high	demand	states.		Thus,	the	firm	chooses	workers	on	standard	contracts,	N,	and	on	overtime/contingent	contracts,	
N’,	to	solve	min𝜋𝑎(𝑁 − 𝑦)! + 1− 𝜋 𝑏(𝑦 − 𝑁 + 𝑁! )! + 𝑤𝑁 + 1− 𝜋 𝜔𝑤𝑁! − 𝜇 𝑁 − 𝑁 − 𝜆𝑁′	
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where	𝜔 ≠ 1	denotes	 the	 percentage	wage	 premium	 (or	 discount)	 and	N’	 is	 the	 total	contingent	labour	input	required.6	All	else	is	as	in	Model	1.	The	first-order	conditions	for	N	and	N’,	respectively,	are		2𝜋𝑎 𝑁 − 𝑦 − 2 1− 𝜋 𝑏 𝑦 − 𝑁 + 𝑁! + 𝑤 − 𝜇 = 0	−2 1− 𝜋 𝑏 𝑦 − 𝑁 + 𝑁! + 1− 𝜋 𝜔𝑤 − 𝜆 = 0	𝑁 − 𝑁 ≥ 0	𝑁! ≥ 0	For	an	interior	solution	for	which	𝑦 > 𝑁	and	𝑁! ≥ 0,	the	nonnegativity	constraints	will	not	 bind	 and	𝜇 = 𝜆 = 0.	Thus,	 under	 conditions	 derived	 below,	 the	 firm	 will	 rely	 on	contingent	labour,	either	in	the	form	of	overtime	or	contract	staff,	even	if	this	labour	is	more	expensive.			Solving	for	N		 𝑁 = 𝑦 + 𝑤2𝜋𝑎 1− 𝜋 𝜔 − 1 	which	depends	only	on	the	low	demand	outcome	rather	than	both	demand	states.		The	bracketed	 right-hand	 side	 term,	 the	 expected	 change	 in	 labour	 cost	when	 contingent	workers	 are	 hired	 or	 overtime	 required,	 may,	 but	 need	 not,	 be	 positive	 if	 the	overtime/contingent	 labour	 wage	 differential	 or	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 high	 demand	state	is	adequately	high.		When	this	is	the	case,	those	on	the	standard	labour	contract,	N,	exceed	the	labour	input	required	to	meet	demand	in	the	low	demand	state,	reducing	the	need	for	overtime/contingent	labour	when	demand	is	high.	Solving	for	N’,	the	overtime	or	contingently	contracted	labour,	
𝑁! = 𝑦 − 𝑦 − 𝑤2 1− 𝜋 𝜔 − 1𝜋𝑎 + 𝜔𝑏 	which	depends	on	 the	difference	between	high	 and	 low	demand.	 	 If	 this	 difference	 is	small,	the	cost	of	contingent	labour	outweighs	the	benefit,	the	non-negativity	constraint	on	 N’	 will	 bind,	 and	 the	 firm	 will	 operate	 under	 Model	 1.	 	 Contingent	 labour	demand/overtime	depends	on	the	cost	differential	between	using	only	permanent	staff	and	 foregoing	overtime	or	contingent	 labour	as	well	as	 the	relative	cost	of	contingent	labour	to	the	cost	of	missing	the	high	demand	target.			The	 firm	 is	 just	 indifferent	between	hiring	or	not	hiring	contingent	 labour/mandating	overtime	 when	𝑁! = 0.		 Then	 the	 difference	 between	 high	 and	 low	 demand,	𝑦 − 𝑦,	 is																																																									6	Premium	payments	for	overtime	are	not	required	in	all	jurisdictions.		Thus,	while	the	United	States	(US	Department	of	Labor	2016)	and	Canada	(Ontario	Ministry	of	Labour	2015),	required	time	and	a	half	for	overtime	work	irrespective	of	the	labour	contract,	standard	or	alternative	work	arrangement,	this	is	not	the	case	of	the	UK	(Metcalf	&	Dudwar	2010).	
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just	equal	to	the	costs	of	hiring	contingent	labour/mandating	overtime,	!! !!! !!!!" + !! .		This	 relationship	 can	be	 interpreted	 in	many	ways.	 	 For	example,	 if	wage,	probability	and	 loss	parameters	are	 fixed	 it	 implies	 the	minimum	deviation	 in	demand	necessary	before	flexible	labour	contracting	is	beneficial	to	the	firm.		Or,	if	the	demand	deviation	is	fixed,	 as	 are	 the	 standard	 wage,	 probabilities	 and	 loss	 parameters,	 it	 implies	 the	maximum	 wage	 premium	 (minimum	 discount)	 consistent	 with	 flexible	 labour	contracting.		This	suggests	that	even	if	firms	in	the	same	industry	face	the	same	demand	uncertainty,	 if	 the	 parameters	 of	 their	 loss	 functions	 differ,	 some	 firms	 may	 avail	 of	labour	flexibility	via	real	options	while	others	do	not.	Differentiating	 the	 labour	 hired	 under	 a	 standard	 contract	 and	 labour	 hired	 under	 a	contingent	or	overtime	contract	we	find		𝑑𝑁𝑑𝑤 ≷ 0   𝑎𝑠 1− 𝜋 𝜔 − 1  ≷  0	𝑑𝑁′𝑑𝑤 ≶ 0  𝑎𝑠 1− 𝜋 𝜔 − 1𝜋𝑎 + 𝜔𝑏  ≷  0	while	 𝑑𝑁𝑑𝜔 > 0,𝑑𝑁′𝑑𝜔 < 0.	The	 firm	 balances	 its	 two	 forms	 of	 labour	 input	 to	 reduce	 its	 costs	 and	 to	 meet	 its	demand	targets.		If	the	probability	weight	on	the	low	demand	outcome	rises		𝑑𝑁𝑑𝜋 < 0,𝑑𝑁′𝑑𝜋 > 0	the	 firm	 reduces	 hours	 worked	 by	 those	 on	 standard	 contracts	 and	 increases	 hours	worked	by	contingent	workers	should	high	demand	be	realized.		If	the	loss	suffered	as	a	result	of	missing	the	low	demand	target	increases	
 𝑑𝑁𝑑𝑎 ≶ 0 𝑎𝑠 1− 𝜋 𝜔 − 1  ≷  0,𝑑𝑁′𝑑𝑎 ≷ 0 𝑖𝑓 1− 𝜋 𝜔 − 1 ≷ 0	given	 a	 positive	 (negative)	 contingent	 cost	 differential,	 the	 firm	 reduces	 (increases)	hours	worked	by	those	on	standard	contracts	while	it	increases	(reduces)	hours	worked	by	 contingent	workers/overtime	 should	 high	 demand	 be	 realized.	 	 Finally,	 if	 the	 loss	suffered	as	a	result	of	missing	the	high	demand	target	increases		
 𝑑𝑁𝑑𝑏 = 0,𝑑𝑁′𝑑𝑏 > 0	the	 firm	 leaves	 its	 core	 hours	 fixed	 and	 relies	 more	 heavily	 on	 overtime/contingent	staffing.			Model	 3:	 	 Insider-Outsider	 Model	 with	 Overtime,	 Flexible	 Rostering	 or	 Contingent	Contracts,	Demand	and	Cost	Uncertainty	
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Consider	an	environment	similar	to	that	in	Model	2,	again	assuming	segmented	labour	markets	but	now	assume	that	there	are	𝑠 ∈ 𝑆distinct	and	verifiable	cost	states.		In	each	cost	state	s	demand	can	be	high,	𝑦!,	or	low,	𝑦!.		The	firm	can	hire	three	types	of	workers:		“insiders”	 on	 standard	 contracts	 (permanent,	 pensionable,	 etc.),	 outsiders	 on	 a	 lower	wage,	contract	 (neither	permanent	nor	pensionable)	contingent	on	 the	cost	state,	and	labour	 on	 a	 wage	 contingent	 both	 on	 the	 cost	 and	 demand	 states.	 	 Assume	insider/standard	 contract	 workers	 are	 required	 for	 production	 to	 take	 place.	 	 Most	model	parameters,	except	 the	standard	wage,	 including	 the	probability	of	 low	or	high	demand,	the	loss	parameters,	and	the	discount	on	the	standard	wage	depend	on	the	cost	state.			Further,	as	before,	assume	that	the	wage	paid	for	demand	contingent	labour	be	either	 a	 premium	 over	 or	 a	 discount	 on	 the	 standard	wage,	where,	 if	 a	 discount,	 the	discount	is	less	than	that	for	outside	workers.	The	firm	chooses	N	insider	workers	on	standard	contracts,	𝑁!"	outsider	workers	in	state	
s	and	𝑁!!	workers	contingent	on	realization	of	high	demand	in	state	s	to	solve	min𝜋!𝑎!(𝑁 + 𝑁!" − 𝑦!)! + 1− 𝜋! 𝑏!(𝑦! − 𝑁 + 𝑁!! + 𝑁!" )! + 𝑤𝑁 + 1− 𝜋! 𝜔!𝑤𝑁!!+ 𝜃!𝑤𝑁!" − 𝜇! 𝑁 − 𝑁 − 𝜆!𝑁!! − 𝛾!𝑁!"	where	0 < 𝜃! < 1	is	 the	discount	 applied	 to	 the	wage	paid	 to	 the	𝑁!"	outsider	workers	and	𝜔! < 𝜃! 𝑖𝑓 𝜔! < 1.	The	first-order	conditions	for	N, 𝑁!!	and	𝑁!"	,	respectively,	for	all	s	are	2𝜋!𝑎! 𝑁 + 𝑁!" − 𝑦! − 2 1− 𝜋! 𝑏! 𝑦! − 𝑁 + 𝑁!! + 𝑁!" + 𝑤 − 𝜇! = 0	−2 1− 𝜋! 𝑏!(𝑦! − 𝑁 + 𝑁!! + 𝑁!" )+ 1− 𝜋! 𝜔!𝑤 − 𝜆! = 0	2𝜋!𝑎!(𝑁 + 𝑁!" − 𝑦!)− 2 1− 𝜋! 𝑏!(𝑦! − 𝑁 + 𝑁!! + 𝑁!" )+ 𝜃!𝑤 − 𝛾! = 0	𝑁 − 𝑁 ≥ 0	𝑁!! ≥ 0	𝑁!" > 0	By	𝜃! < 1,	𝜇! > 0	for	 all	 s,	 N,	 insider	 labour,	 will	 be	 at	 the	 minimum	 necessary	 for	production	to	take	place	in	all	states	s.		Solving	for	state-contingent,	outsider	labour	and	cost	and	demand	state	contingent	labour	we	have	
𝑁!" = 𝑦! − 𝑁 + 𝑤 1− 𝜋! 𝜔! − 𝜃!2𝜋!𝑎! 		 𝑁!! = 𝑦! − 𝑦! − 𝑤 1− 𝜋! 𝜔! − 𝜃!2𝜋!𝑎! + 𝜔!2𝑏! 	Since	insider	labour	is	state	independent,	the	firm	solves	S	separate	labour	demand	exercises	leading	to	up	to	2S	real	options	contracts	agreed	prior	to	the	realization	of	the	either	the	cost	state	or	demand	in	that	cost	state.	In	this	model	outsiders,	whose	contracts	are	ratified	when	costs	are	revealed,	provide	flexibility	with	respect	to	cost	
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fluctuations	and	contingent/overtime	labour	provides	flexibility	with	respect	to	demand	fluctuations.		Dropping	the	state	subscript	for	notational	simplicity,	and	noting	that,	as	in	Model	2,	the	firm	is	just	indifferent	between	hiring	demand	contingent	labour/mandating	overtime	when	𝑁! = 0.		This	defines	the	“strike”	for	the	demand	contingent	real	options	contract.		At	this	point	the	difference	between	high	and	low	demand,	𝑦 − 𝑦,	is	just	equal	to	the	increase	in	costs	of	hiring	contingent	labour/mandating	overtime,	!! !!! !!!!" + !! .		This	relationship	has	the	same	interpretations	as	in	Model	2	given	that	once	the	product	market	state	is	realized	the	firm’s	decision	is	essentially	identical	to	that	in	Model	2.			The	firm	is	indifferent	between	hiring	outsider/cost	state	contingent	labour	when	𝑁" = 0. 		This	defines	the	“strike”	for	the	cost	contingent	real	options	contract.		At	this	point	the	difference	between	low	demand	and	output	produced	with	mandated	labour,	𝑦 − 𝑁,	is	just	equal	to	the	cost	saving	of	hiring	outsiders,	where	any	productivity	differentials	are	subsumed	in	the	wage	discount,	−!! !!! !!!!" .			Again	the	strike	will	define,	for	example,	given	the	standard	wage,	the	demand	probabilities,	cost	of	overproducing	in	the	low	demand	state	and	the	overtime/demand	state	contingent	wage	differential	the	maximum	feasible	discount	consistent	with	hiring	outsider	labour.			
